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 Anthony Lewis: What He Learned at 
Harvard Law School 
Lincoln Caplan* 
Anthony Lewis was a columnist for The New York Times for the unusu-
ally long tenure of thirty-two years.1  When he retired in 2001 at the age of 
seventy-four, Bill Clinton awarded him the Presidential Citizens Medal for 
setting “the highest standard of journalistic ethics and excellence” and for 
being “a clear and courageous voice for democracy and justice.”2  Lewis end-
ed his last column by paraphrasing one of his heroes: “The most important 
office in a democracy, Justice Louis Brandeis said, is the office of citizen.”3  
Lewis’ point was that the American commitment to the rule of law and the 
belief in reason on which it rests both depend on citizens standing up to rulers 
who abuse power by exercising it unreasonably – arbitrarily and unjustly.4 
Lewis sounded like a classic outsider, who believed that his most im-
portant job as a journalist was to be a stand-in for citizens as an adversary of 
the government.  In America today, that is the idealized stance for a journal-
 
* Lincoln Caplan is the Truman Capote Visiting Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School 
and the author of The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law and 
Skadden: Power, Money, and the Rise of a Legal Empire, among other books.  He 
wrote about the Supreme Court for The New York Times as a member of the paper’s 
editorial board.  Thanks to Yale Law School, in particular Dean Robert C. Post and 
Deputy Deans Alvin K. Klevorick and Douglas Kysar, for the opportunity to teach 
there again, use its splendid library, and be reminded of its uncommon commitment to 
illuminating journalism about legal affairs, and to support at Yale Law School from 
the Truman Capote Literary Trust; to the University of Virginia Law School, in par-
ticular John C. Jeffries, Jr., Risa Goluboff, and G. Edward White, for valuable feed-
back when I presented a previous version of this article at a faculty workshop; to 
Jillian Dent and others on the Missouri Law Review, for their careful editing, and to 
Richard C. Reuben of the University of Missouri Law School, for inviting me to con-
tribute to this symposium; to Akhil Reed Amar, Anne Coughlin, Michael Ignatieff, 
David Ignatius, and Rafe Sagalyn, for their generous interest in and support of this 
project; to Vicki Jackson, who encouraged me to take on this subject; and to Margaret 
H. Marshall, for entrusting me with invaluable documents and for her indispensable 
observations. 
 1. Anthony Lewis Dies at 85; Two-Time Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalist, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-anthony-
lewis-20130326-story.html. 
 2. President Clinton Awards the Presidential Citizens Medals, WHITE HOUSE 
(Jan. 8, 2001), http://clinton5.nara.gov/WH/new/html/Mon_Jan_8_141714_2001.ht- 
ml. 
 3. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Abroad at Home; Hail and Farewell, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/15/opinion/abroad-at-home-hail-
and-farewell.html?ref=anthonylewis. 
 4. See id. 
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ist.  Glenn Greenwald, the former columnist for The Guardian who co-
founded the website called The Intercept, is a prominent example.5  He was 
responsible for The Guardian US sharing the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for Public 
Service with The Washington Post.6  The Guardian’s award based on Green-
wald’s work, the Pulitzer Prize Board said, was for the paper’s “revelation of 
widespread secret surveillance by the National Security Agency, helping 
through aggressive reporting to spark a debate about the relationship between 
the government and the public over issues of security and privacy.”7 
In interviews about this work based on massive leaks from the former 
N.S.A. contractor Edward Snowden, Greenwald has avowed that in the age of 
the surveillance state, with the United States government eliminating much of 
what privacy once entailed, the role of the press is to be confrontational.8  
The press’s duty, he said, is to call-out government lies, expose unwarranted 
secrecy, and avoid the deplorable habit of “the establishment media”9 bowing 
in “glaring subservience to political power.”10  It is the press’s role, in other 
words, to be combative.  When it is, the press provides the check and balance 
against the executive branch that neither Congress nor the judiciary have 
done anywhere near adequately.  It helps reverse the anxiety-fueled swing of 
the pendulum toward police-state-like overprotection of national security, 
pushing the pendulum back toward the constitutionally guaranteed protection 
of individual rights. 
Lewis often fit this model: he was a formidable critic of the government, 
in particular of its penchant for secrecy.11  He was an insistent defender of 
citizens against government encroachments, especially of their right to priva-
cy.12  He was indignant about brutality that government sometimes inflicted, 
as when southern states used police to beat up people protesting against seg-
regation, and about fear that government sometimes instilled in citizens to 
manipulate them, as in the period after the attacks against the United States 
 
 5. See Defying Threats to Journalism, Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald 
Launch New Venture, The Intercept, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.
democracynow.org/2014/2/10/defying_threats_to_journalism_jeremy_scahill. 
 6. See The 2014 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Public Service, PULITZER PRIZES, 
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2014-Public-Service (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Michiko Kakutani, Snowden’s Story, Behind the Scenes: ‘No Place to 
Hide,’ by Glenn Greenwald, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/05/13/books/no-place-to-hide-by-glenn-greenwald.html?hpw&rref=books. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Bill Keller, Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/a-conversation-in-lieu-of-a-
column.html?_r=0. 
 11. Anthony Lewis, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.medialaw.org/
events/185-anthony-lewis (last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 12. Id. 
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on 9/11.13  Lewis condemned those wrongs and sought to right them through 
his journalism.  He was a liberal who pushed for liberal causes: liberty, equal-
ity, and the rule of law; fair and open elections; human rights; and freedom of 
expression and religion.14 
Yet Lewis’ journalism was fundamentally not adversarial: it was defined 
by what he was for, much more than by what he was against.  As a member 
of the press, in a remarkable contrast to today’s idealized stance, he felt a 
duty to explain and stand up for the constitutional system and the govern-
ment’s central part in it, as well as to challenge when the government violated 
American laws and values.15  That’s why it was apt that the presidential med-
al was given to him for being “a clear and courageous voice for democracy 
and justice.”16 
The story of how he developed that voice begins as an ever-receding 
footnote to history, but it is much more than that.  Ten presidents ago, when 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House, going back almost one-
fourth of the way through American history, the Times sent Anthony Lewis to 
study law at Harvard for one academic year, in 1956-57.17  While he received 
no degree, Lewis later summed up his experience like this: “The Harvard 
Law School opened my eyes to the law . . .”18 
That year – in an era of giant change for the Court – Lewis learned 
about the most challenging and important ideas then being debated by schol-
ars who specialized in the Constitution and the Supreme Court.  Those ideas 
reinforced his liberal sympathies and ideals, but they also changed his think-
ing fundamentally.  They led him to adopt a traditionalist view about the im-
portance of understanding the American constitutional system and how (in 
his words) “history, law, and culture contribute to the process of defining 
what the Constitution commands.”19 
Those ideas also helped Lewis establish his distinctive stance as a jour-
nalist: he was fastidiously independent, yet passionately invested in the 
American project.  He was both an outsider and an insider.  He understood 
better than any other journalist why it was indefensible for the government to 
prosecute any journalist under the Espionage Act, as the Obama administra-
tion has done, unless the journalist was actually a spy.20  But Lewis also un-
derstood that journalists should not get blanket immunity from subpoenas in 
 
 13. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 147-49 (2007). 
 14. Anthony Lewis Dies at 85; Two-Time Pulitzer Prize-Winning Journalist, 
supra note 1. 
 15. See Anthony Lewis, supra note 11. 
 16. President Clinton Awards the Presidential Citizens Medals, supra note 2. 
 17. L.A. Powe, Jr., Writing the First Draft of History: Anthony Lewis as Su-
preme Court Correspondent, 29 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 177, 177 (2004). 
 18. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, at ix (1991). 
 19. LEWIS, supra note 13, at x-xi. 
 20. See id. at 101-30. 
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criminal cases, since they are subject to the law like everyone else.21  It is 
their job to hold the government to its principles, but that does not give jour-
nalists license to hide behind the law if they do their job badly, in an effort to 
cover up a mistake of no benefit to the Republic and of potentially great harm 
to an individual about whom they had been mistaken.22 
Lewis had exquisite skills as a journalist, but in the sense that British 
universities call law students lawyers, he was also a lawyer with remarkable 
skills.  He loved both professions and believed that they were bound together: 
the press is integral to the process of governance because of its quasi-
constitutional role under the First Amendment; the law is essential because it 
is the foundation of American government and is called on to resolve so 
many fundamental issues of national politics and social policy. 
His reporting and writing about the law transformed legal journalism.  
He became American law’s leading liberal tribune, but even more significant-
ly, the country’s most lucid and influential teacher about the workings of its 
constitutional system.  The foundation of his journalism was the conviction 
that the effective functioning of the system of government, especially the 
courts, is essential to the survival and the health of the American Republic.  
He was a great journalist and the country’s greatest journalist about legal 
affairs.  It is an honor to be included in this symposium about him following 
his death in 2013 at the age of eighty-five.23 
“A Scholar Who Can Run” 
Lewis was twenty-nine when he went up to Harvard,24 already a star re-
porter with an ardent interest in stories involving law and justice.  The year 
before he started law school, he had won a Pulitzer Prize for National Report-
ing,25 for a six-part series26 of articles in The Washington Daily News.27  Ac-
cording to the prize committee, the articles “were adjudged directly responsi-
ble for clearing Abraham Chasanow, an employee of the U.S. Navy Depart-
ment, and bringing about his restoration to duty with an acknowledgment by 
the Navy Department that it had committed a grave injustice in dismissing 
him as a security risk.”28 
 
 21. See id. at 90-100. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Adam Liptak, Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Reporter Who Brought Law to 
Life, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/03/26/us/anthony-lewis-pulitzer-prize-winning-columnist-dies-at-
85.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 24. See id. 
 25. 1955 Winners, PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1955 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 26. CATHY D. KNEPPER, GREENBELT, MARYLAND: A LIVING LEGACY OF THE 
NEW DEAL 100 (2001). 
 27. 1955 Winners, supra note 25. 
 28. Id. 
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In 1953, when Senator Joseph McCarthy’s fear-mongering campaign 
was at its peak to brand dissenters as traitors and force them out of the United 
States government under the guise of fighting Communism, Chasanow was 
dismissed based on charges by an accuser who was never identified.29  The 
Lewis series exposed this wrong and led to highly publicized hearings where 
the Navy produced no evidence to support the charges.30  Chasanow was re-
instated.31  The Secretary of the Navy acknowledged injustice through an 
official apology.32 
Lewis went to Harvard as a Nieman Fellow to prepare for covering the 
Supreme Court, a very different kind of assignment.33  Paul Freund was a 
Harvard Law School professor and an eminent scholar about the Court and 
the U.S. Constitution.34  He wrote that the Court then, “despite its pivotal 
role, has been by all odds the least adequately and intelligently covered of all 
government departments.”35  In retrospect, that isn’t all that surprising.  By 
the time Lewis arrived at Harvard Law School, the U.S. Supreme Court 
building was just twenty-one years-old.36  Until October of 1935, the Court 
had heard argument in the basement of the U.S. Capitol and – because they 
had no courthouse – the justices worked at their own homes.37  In the most 
basic way, the Court had been difficult to cover because it was a phantom 
institution without a home. 
With a concerted nudge from Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Times’ 
James Reston, who was the paper’s Washington Bureau Chief, had decided 
that it was time for the Times to have a reporter who specialized in the 
Court.38  He chose Lewis, who he had hired in 1955.39  Reston said Lewis 
 
 29. Abraham Chasanow, 78, an Aid Vindicated in Navy Security Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 14, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/14/obituaries/abraham-
chasanow-78-an-aide-vindicated-in-navy-security-case.html; see also 1941-1963, 
U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Have_you_no
_sense_of_decency.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 30. Abraham Chasanow, 78, an Aid Vindicated in Navy Security Case, supra 
note 29. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Three Brave Men Movie and Discussion, GREENBELT IN 2012 (Feb. 10, 
2012), http://greenbelt2012.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/three-brave-men-movie-and-
discussion/. 
 33. Liptak, supra note 23. 
 34. Eric Pace, Paul A. Freund, Authority on Constitution, Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/06/us/paul-a-freund-authority-on-
constitution-dies-at-83.html. 
 35. Letter from Paul A. Freund, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, Harvard Law 
Sch., to Advisory Board on the Pulitzer Prizes (Jan. 31, 1963) (copy on file with Mar-
garet H. Marshall). 
 36. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi14 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 37. Homes of the Court, SUPREME COURT HIST. SOC’Y, http://supremecourthis-
tory.org/history_homesofthecourt.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 38. Powe, Jr., supra note 17. 
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was “that rare and precious commodity in a newspaper office: a scholar who 
can run.”40 
At Harvard, Lewis took Freund’s course in constitutional law and 
learned about what the professor regarded as the conundrums of the federal 
system: the tensions among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; 
the intertwined yet distinct powers of the federal and state governments; the 
layering in cases of technical, conceptual, and human issues; and the compet-
ing principles in every important constitutional question.41  The course had a 
lasting effect on Lewis.  Freund became a regular sounding board for him 
when he wrote about the Supreme Court. 
Yet the course that grappled most directly with these workings was a 
relatively new one at Harvard called Federal Courts and the Federal System.42  
It was the course that changed Lewis’ life43 – and that eventually transformed 
legal journalism.  Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. taught the class.44  In 1953, 
with Herbert Wechsler of Columbia Law School as his co-author, Hart pub-
lished The Federal Courts and the Federal System.45  The book is one of the 
most important in American law.46  Now in its sixth edition47 and co-authored 
by four current leading scholars,48 it is a classic in legal education – and has 
been since it was first published.49 
Hart had been President of the Harvard Law Review,50 clerked for Jus-
tice Louis Brandeis,51 and joined the Harvard faculty in 1932.52  Freund was a 
 
 39. Liptak, supra note 23. 
 40. Quote by James Reston, 1964 (copy on file in the private papers of Margaret 
H. Marshall).  
 41. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall). 
 42. James E. Pfander, Fifty Years (More or Less) of “Federal Courts”: An Anni-
versary Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1083, 1090 & nn.25-26 (2002). 
 43. Interview with Margaret H. Marshall (Mar. 6, 2014). 
 44. Pfander, supra note 42. 
 45. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System by Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin, and David 
Shapiro.  Westbury, New York: Foundation Press.  1988.  3d ed., 102 HARV. L. REV. 
688, 689 (1989) (book review). 
 46. Id. at 688. 
 47. See Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 6th, 
WEST ACADEMIC, http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductDetails.aspx?NS
IID=1892 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials. By David P. 
Currie. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1968, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1753 (1970) (book 
review). 
 50. Paul A. Freund, Henry M. Hart, Jr.: In Memoriam, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 
1595 (1969). 
 51. Id. at 1596. 
 52. Hart, Henry Melvin.  Papers, 1927-1969: Finding Aid, HARVARD U. LIBR., 
http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00107 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
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junior editor on the law review when Hart presided, and they were colleagues 
for four decades.53  In Freund’s words, Hart was “a supremely attractive fig-
ure and a supremely compelling force” who had “formidable intellectual 
powers.”54 
Wechsler was equally impressive, though deliberate and sometimes dour 
where Hart was dynamic and often dazzling.  Wechsler had been Editor-in-
Chief of the Columbia Law Review, joined the Columbia faculty immediately 
after graduating, left after a year to clerk for Justice (later Chief Justice) Har-
lan Fiske Stone, and re-joined the faculty in 1933.55  In the words of Profes-
sor Henry P. Monaghan, who holds the Harlan Fiske Stone professorship in 
constitutional law at Columbia, which Wechsler long held, “When Herbert 
Wechsler was in his prime, he stood at the top of three separate fields, consti-
tutional law, criminal law and federal courts.”56 
In 1954, Hart explained in a law review article the density of the chal-
lenge that the casebook was designed to help judges, lawyers, and future law-
yers meet: 
The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single 
system of law: it speaks in relation to any particular question with on-
ly one ultimately authoritative voice, however difficult it may be on 
occasion to discern in advance which of two or more conflicting voic-
es really carries authority.  In the long run and in the large, this must 
be so.  People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov’s dogs, to two or more 
inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the incon-
sistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the dogs did.  The socie-
ty, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown.  Yet the sources of 
the laws which say what Americans can, may or must do or not do and 
what happens if they act differently, or which seek to influence by of-
ficial action what they are able or choose to do on their own account 
in the infinity of situations in which they have to decide whether to do 
or not do something, are exceedingly diverse.  The problems of devel-
oping the necessary mechanisms for evoking or enforcing harmony 
are correspondingly complex.57 
Hart and Wechsler, with another Harvard professor, were the prime ar-
ticulators through their scholarship and their teaching of an approach to legal 
analysis intended to manage the complexity, known as “the legal process 
 
 53. Freund, supra note 50, at 1595. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Herbert Wechsler 1909-2000, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R2
204_Wechsler.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 56. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 28, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-
giant-is-dead-at-90.html. 
 57. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489 (1954). 
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school.”58  Albert M. Sacks, a former President of the Harvard Law Review 
and later Dean of Harvard Law School, was the other professor, who, with 
Hart, produced a set of teaching materials known as Hart and Sacks.59  (Sacks 
had been a student of Hart’s in a course on legislation: Hart’s first question in 
the course was, “What is our idea of ‘law,’ Mr. Sacks, President of the ‘Law’ 
Review?”)60  For the two decades from before the start of the Second World 
War until the end of the 1950s – roughly from 1938 until 195961 – “the legal 
process” was the most influential way of thinking about the American consti-
tutional system among leading scholars.62 
By serendipity, for the only time in his career, Wechsler was a visiting 
professor at Harvard Law School the year Lewis was a student.63  The law 
school’s dean, Erwin Griswold, invited him and two other world-class schol-
ars (from England’s Oxford and Australia’s University of Sydney) to teach at 
Harvard for the year so they could debate with each other and other scholars 
about jurisprudence.64  Wechsler taught one of the first-year sections of crim-
inal law.65  He also occasionally co-taught Hart’s federal courts course.66  
From Hart and Wechsler, then, Lewis learned what is still known as Hart & 
Wechsler – the iconic textbook and the philosophy it imparts.67 
For virtually every follower of the Supreme Court today, the paramount 
question is: What is the right outcome in substantive law?  Does the First 
Amendment’s protection of free speech allow Congress to limit contributions 
to political campaigns?  Does the amendment’s prohibition against govern-
ment support for a specific religion allow a city to keep churches from using 
public schools on Sundays as places of worship?   
The legal process school wasn’t fixated on outcomes.  Instead, it showed 
how “process” – rules of procedure but also different parts of federal and 
 
 58. Amar, supra note 45, at 691 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. See Biographies, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/
clinical/bellow-sacks/Templates/biosacks.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2014). 
 60. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Pro-
cess, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2037 n.31 (1994). 
 61. Id. at 2049. 
 62. DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM W. FISHER, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 243-44 (2006). 
 63. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1359, 1359 (2000); Liptak, supra note 23. 
 64. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 60, at 2047-48.  The “Legal Philosophy 
Discussion Group” at Harvard that year brought together more than thirty professors 
who were among that generation’s most influential thinkers about public law, dealing 
with relations between individuals and the government and among individuals in 
society.  Id. 
 65. Ginsburg, supra note 63, at 1359.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one of nine 
women in a class of about 500, was a student in that section.  She called him “awe-
some and inspiring” in a memorial piece about him after his death in 2000.  Id. 
 66. See id. at 1359 n.1. 
 67. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009). 
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state government that affect the way a dispute is resolved – shaped substan-
tive law.68  Paul Freund summarized Hart’s scholarship like this: he “saw the 
integrity and fitness of the legal process as a kind of transcendent natural law, 
a law above laws . . . .”69 
The school focused on institutional competence, asking which institu-
tion should make a legal decision and how: The federal or a state govern-
ment?70  An executive agency, the legislature, or a court?  A trial court or a 
court of appeals?  If a trial court, a judge or a jury?  As Hart and Wechsler 
explained in their casebook, “[i]n varying contexts we pose the issue of what 
courts are good for – and are not good for . . . .”71  The 1956-57 course cata-
logue of Harvard Law School put the point more formally.  The “principal 
emphasis” of the course was “upon the central problems of legal statesman-
ship in the delimitation of the powers of government with which the federal 
courts have been and are confronted.”72 
During the early part of the twentieth century, the philosophy of legal 
realism had won many converts to the view that judges did not reach deci-
sions by deducing principles of law from court precedents and other 
sources.73  Law was not a series of syllogisms that judges applied in a self-
contained universe of legal reasoning insulated from politics.  The decisions 
of judges reflected their views on politics in its deepest meaning. 
Yet, while judges relied increasingly on social science to help them 
make decisions, judgments about law reflecting policy choices – so-called 
purposive legal reasoning – yielded what the legal historian David M. Ken-
nedy euphemistically called “legal pluralism and unpredictable outcomes”74 – 
a mess of contradictions. 
Yale Law School’s Akhil Reed Amar explained the focus of the legal 
process school: “Given that judges unavoidably made substantive law at 
times, what kinds of laws could they legitimately make, and when?  What 
kinds of legal decisions were better left to other institutional and political 
actors?”75  The federal system and, in particular, the federal courts were at the 
heart of this inquiry. 
For most of the twentieth century until the Second World War, a con-
servative Supreme Court had often struck down progressive legislation 
 
 68. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 60, at 2035-36. 
 69. Freund, supra note 50, at 1596. 
 70. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 60, at 2032-33. 
 71. Amar, supra note 45, at 691. 
 72. OFFICIAL REGISTER OF HARVARD UNIV., THE CATALOGUE OF THE LAW 
SCHOOL 50 (1956), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/digital/harvard-
law-school-catalogs.html. 
 73. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2005); see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, 
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 179 (1986). 
 74. KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 62, at 245. 
 75. Amar, supra note 45, at 693. 
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passed to regulate the American economy and society, based on what liberal 
scholars considered grounds of policy.  Then, one year after the Hart and 
Wechsler casebook was published, a newly liberal Court under its new Chief 
Justice, Earl Warren, outlawed segregation in public schools, in Brown v. 
Board of Education, deciding an issue that conservative scholars considered a 
matter for states to decide.76 
The great proponents of judicial restraint in the early twentieth century 
were liberals, like Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.77  
They believed much of the progressive legislation struck down by the con-
servative Court was constitutional and in the public interest.78  When the 
Warren Court applied its expanding vision of equality to other parts of Amer-
ican life aside from public schools, it was conservatives who advocated re-
straint.79  That reversal of roles seemed to support the view of legal realists 
about how much politics shaped law, but it provided no way to resolve im-
portant legal differences.  The legal process school did. 
Amar explained: “. . . [T]he legal process theorists sought to specify 
with precision the boundaries and purposes of federal judicial power.  Once 
these boundaries and purposes were specified, federal judicial decision-
making could be both legitimated and restrained.”80  Hart, Wechsler, and 
other scholars sought, basically, to define what “law” is and to differentiate it 
from policy. 
They provided a way to think about significant disagreements as some-
thing other than politics.  They provided a method for sorting through the 
many new legal conflicts that arose as a result of the dramatic expansion of 
federal power during the New Deal and the Second World War.81  The em-
phasis on thorough reasoning about a law’s purpose, in a legal process that 
was open and transparent, was critical to the legitimacy of the law.  In em-
phasizing close analysis and careful argument, the method also defined the 
essence of good lawyering.82  Especially in the 1950s when the American 
 
 76. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System. By Paul 
M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler. Mineola, New 
York: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1973, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1974) (book review). 
 77. See Mark B. Rotenberg, Politics, Personality and Judging: The Lessons of 
Brandeis and Frankfurter on Judicial Restraint: The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connec-
tion. By Bruce Allen Murphy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.  The Enigma 
of Felix Frankfurter. By H.N. Hirsch. New York: Basic Books, 1981, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1863, 1874 (1983) (book review). 
 78. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 519, 529 (2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissent-
ing). 
 80. Amar, supra note 45, at 694. 
 81. KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 62, at 243-44. 
 82. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 75 (1987). 
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economy grew briskly, this approach reflected optimism about law as “a con-
tinuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.”83  But the au-
thority of the approach did not turn on whether the striving succeeded.  To 
Harvard Law School’s Richard H. Fallon, Jr., a co-author of recent revisions 
of Hart and Wechsler’s textbook, their “single, controlling insight” is that 
“authority to decide must at least sometimes include authority to decide 
wrongly.”84 
In constitutional law, the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison,85 de-
cided in 1803, is of overriding importance.86  It states the basis for the exer-
cise of judicial review under the Constitution – why the Supreme Court has 
the final say on the meaning of that foundational law.87  In his course on fed-
eral courts,88 Hart asked why the case “doesn’t belong solely to the course in 
Constitutional Law?”89 
Hart’s notes go on, “What gives the court power to decide whether the 
statute is constitutional is presence of this case before it.”90  Under its authori-
ty to decide cases and controversies, the Supreme Court had the duty to re-
solve the case – what Hart called “the pure settling element.”91  But it also 
had the duty to do that “in accordance with law,”92 so “its law-declaring pow-
er exists only as an incident of the obligation to decide cases.”93 
Above all, the essential function of the Supreme Court and of federal 
courts in general was to resolve disputes that were properly before them 
(“concrete, narrowly focused disputes,” in the words of Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr.) and to leave policy-making to the states and the other federal branches, 
except when policy was made in what Fallon called “the interstices of statuto-
ry or constitutional commands.”94 
Lewis kept his notes from the Hart course.  They are in his widow’s pri-
vate papers.  On the first page – in the notebook of “J.A. Lewis, 1572 Mass. 
 
 83. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 60, at 2042 (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 166 (1958)). 
 84. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 953, 962 (1994). 
 85. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 86. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The 
Emergence of a “Great Case”, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 375-76 (2003). 
 87. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78. 
 88. In 2002, Professor James Pfander of Northwestern Law School published 
some of Hart’s 1949 course notes, which are available at the Harvard Law School 
Library.  See generally Pfander, supra note 42. 
 89. Id. at 1094. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1096. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1095. 
 94. Fallon, supra note 84, at 958. 
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Ave.” on “Sept 20”95 – he wrote down how Hart expressed that axiom in 
class: “Court’s law-declaring power exists only as incident to its power to 
decide cases.”96  On the second page of the notebook, opposite the continua-
tion of his notes about legal ideas, Lewis wrote this, using the quotation 
marks: “Provocation by irritatingly dogmatic statement.”97  That’s what Hart, 
with a word change here or there, called the style of teaching he used to get 
students to engage with him.  It definitely worked on Lewis. 
David L. Shapiro, a longtime Harvard Law School professor, now re-
tired, who served as a Deputy Solicitor General of the United States, co-
authored each of the five revisions of the Hart and Wechsler casebook.98  
Shapiro took the Hart course when Lewis was a student.99  He recently re-
called that the course – known as “Darkness at Noon” because it was held at 
lunchtime and was often considered baffling100 – sometimes seemed like a 
dialogue between Hart and Lewis.101 
Lewis’ notebook is filled with puzzles conveying the spirit of the 
course: 
Hart Oct. 4 (+ Wechsler) 
Suppose: Congress proposes law making state criminal verdicts final, 
no review or habeas corpus writs in Fed courts. 
Constitutional? 
Wechsler says Yes – valid – but bad policy. 
(Notes Habeas Corpus power of Fed Cts extended only to Fed prison-
ers until Congressional act of 1867.) 
 
 95. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(Sept. 20, 1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See David L. Shapiro, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/direct-
ory/10791/Shapiro (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 99. See E-mail from David L. Shapiro, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of 
Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law Sch., to author (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author). 
 100. Pfander, supra note 42, at 1098-99.  In 1956-57, according to a schedule of 
the courses Lewis attended that he wrote on the last page of his notebook for Civil 
Procedure, the Hart course began at 11 a.m. on Wednesdays and Thursdays.  Notes by 
Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. (1956) (on file with 
Margaret H. Marshall).  That year, according to The Catalogue of the Law School, 
Hart’s was a full-year course.  OFFICIAL REGISTER OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra 
note 72, at 133. 
 101. See E-mail from David L. Shapiro to author, supra note 99. 
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W – Must do some “constitutional thinking” in British sense – wisdom 
in terms of ancient rights, not enforceable, written rights.102 
Or: 
Hart Nov 1 
“It seems tolerably certain that state courts have no power to annul an 
official determination by any federal administrative officer.” 
True or false? 
Tricky Q because even fed cts don’t usually annul fed laws – just ig-
nore! 
Unless Congress has given specific juris to annul, as in decisions of 
NLRB. 
So really true.103 
Reading Lewis’ notes today, in a brown Maple Leaf spiral notebook 
marked “Federal,” almost sixty years after he wrote down Hart’s words and 
his own thoughts about them in a legible and upright cursive, is like watching 
Lewis – meticulous and inspired – lay the foundation for his writing about the 
Supreme Court for the rest of his life.104 
“Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts”  
When Lewis was at Harvard Law School, Justice Frankfurter kept close 
ties with members of the faculty he had long been part of as a professor.  At 
the end of Lewis’ year, Frankfurter wrote the publisher of The New York 
Times: “One of the most influential members of the faculty of that School 
told me the other day that Tony Lewis has upset some of the pedagogical 
presuppositions of the School.”105 
Many at the school had been “under the delusion that there is an appro-
priate progression” in its courses, Frankfurter went on.106  As the school’s 
1956-57 catalogue explained, in the first year a student was expected to 
 
 102. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(Oct. 4, 1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall). 
 103. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(Nov. 1, 1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall). 
 104. See Notes by Anthony Lewis, supra note 41. 
 105. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Arthur 
Hays Sulzberger, Publisher, N.Y. Times (June 24, 1957) (copy on file with Margaret 
H. Marshall). 
 106. Id. 
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“begin to develop a capacity for legal analysis and to gain an understanding 
of the judicial process and the factors that influence its operation.”107  Consti-
tutional Law was a second-year course, to continue that capacity building.108  
Federal Courts was a third-year course – and was expected to seriously test 
how much capacity a student had built.109 
In his one year of law school, Frankfurter said, Lewis had taken both of 
those courses “in stride.”110  Lewis’ Nieman Fellowship required that he take 
one course for one term – a half course, in other words – without being grad-
ed.111  Lewis’ notes from his year as a law student are not explicit, but they 
strongly suggest that he took three full-year courses.  (The third was Civil 
Procedure: his notebook for that subject indicates he attended two first-year 
procedure classes, one taught at 9 a.m. by Benjamin Kaplan, the other at noon 
by Albert M. Sacks, Hart’s partner in developing the legal process materi-
als.)112  Frankfurter reported to the Times’ publisher: “I am advised that in the 
two courses that are mainly concerned with the work of the Supreme Court, 
Tony Lewis attained marks in the examinations that very few men attain.”113  
More importantly, he came away with a sophisticated understanding of 
American law and government as an elaborate, judicious, and progressive 
system, with the Supreme Court interpreting and enforcing what he described 
as “a Constitution drawn with ‘purposeful vagueness’ . . . in accordance with 
the changing needs of government and society.”114  
Lewis wrote these words during his Nieman year in something he had 
never written before, a law review article.  The Harvard Law Review pub-
lished it in 1958.115  The law review seldom published signed articles by re-
cent graduates, let alone “special students” like Lewis: for a young legal 
scholar, that was considered a coup and a major sign of a very promising 
career.116  The article made clear what exceptional use Lewis had made of his 
law-school year. 
 
 107. OFFICIAL REGISTER OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 72, at 12. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 50-51. 
 110. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, supra note 105. 
 111. Fellowships, NIEMAN, http://nieman.harvard.edu/fellowships/#faq (last visit-
ed Nov. 15, 2014). 
 112. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall); see also Professor Emeritus Benjamin 
Kaplan: 1911-2010, HARV. L. SCH., (Jan. 1, 2011), http://today.law.harvard.edu/
professor-emeritus-benjamin-kaplan-1911-2010/. 
 113. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, supra note 105. 
 114. Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1095 (1958). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitu-
tional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965).  Fiss graduated from Harvard Law 
School in 1964.  Id. 
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Called Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, it urged “Su-
preme Court action as the only effective means to correct the growing evil of 
inequitably apportioned legislative districts.”117  Lewis contended: 
It is evident that one of our major national failures since World War II 
has been the failure to meet the problems of rapid urbanization.  The 
decay of the center city, disorderly suburban growth, and crises in ed-
ucation, housing, and transportation have become familiar facts in 
every metropolitan area.  A fundamental reason that these problems 
have not been adequately met is urban political weakness, stemming 
in large part from the underrepresentation of urban areas in the state 
and national legislatures.118 
A footnote explained that the phrase “purposeful vagueness” to describe 
the Constitution was from a Frankfurter essay, The Judicial Process and the 
Supreme Court.119  In other circumstances, quoting the Justice might have 
been a student’s tip of the hat to a venerated master: he had been a highly 
influential teacher of Lewis’ teachers – Hart and Wechsler dedicated their 
casebook, “To FELIX FRANKFURTER who first opened our minds to these 
problems,”120 as the pioneer in focusing his scholarship on the power of fed-
eral courts as opposed to their procedures for denying or considering cases.121  
Lewis knew of Frankfurter’s hope, as the Justice wrote to the Times’ publish-
er, that Lewis would “demonstrate that high competence for covering the 
Supreme Court is as important as in covering the World Series.”122 
But in this instance, the use of the quotation was more likely tactical: 
secondarily, it was perhaps a diplomatic touch, an effort to keep the Justice 
from responding cantankerously, as he was known to do;123 primarily, it was 
almost certainly a discreet appeal to Frankfurter that he reconsider his view – 
that “[t]he remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures 
that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”124  
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the man responsible for Lewis go-
ing to law school and for his chance to cover the Supreme Court was the cen-
tral antagonist to Lewis’ reformist view about reapportionment.  Lewis chal-
lenged Frankfurter head-on. 
 
 117. Lewis, supra note 114, at 1057. 
 118. Id. at 1058. 
 119. Id. at 1095 n.218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, at xxxi (1927). 
 121. Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Feder-
alism”, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 757 (1993). 
 122. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, supra note 105. 
 123. See Jill Lepore, The Great Paper Caper: Someone Swiped Justice Frankfur-
ter’s Papers. What Else Has Gone Missing?, NEW YORKER (Dec. 1, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/great-paper-caper. 
 124. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
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Justice Frankfurter had made his view clear in 1946, in the prevailing 
opinion for the Court in the leading case on legislative apportionment, Co-
legrove v. Green.  By a 4-3 vote in the case (one justice was recused;125 an-
other was in the hospital and unable to take part),126 the justices rejected a 
challenge to unfair districting in Illinois because, Frankfurter wrote famously, 
“Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”127 
Lewis’ article is a model of legal-process analysis of a major federal 
problem.  It demonstrates how that method, which favored moderate advanc-
es in the law and was sometimes criticized for being unnecessarily cautious, 
could make far more persuasive a landmark assertion of judicial power: 
It is the thesis of this article that the course laid out in Colegrove – ab-
stention by the judiciary and reliance on the legislative branches to 
remedy unfairness in districting – is neither required legally nor effec-
tive practically.  The precedents in the state courts show that the judi-
ciary can deal effectively with the apportionment problem.  An exam-
ination of historical material demonstrates that a right to equality of 
representation can be drawn from the Constitution.  The evidence is 
overwhelming that neither Congress nor the state legislatures can be 
relied on to ensure equitable representation, indeed that there are vir-
tually insurmountable, built-in obstacles to legislative action.  The Su-
preme Court has found special justification for judicial intervention to 
preserve basic political liberties – of speech, press, assembly.  The 
right to fair representation can be of no less importance.  A vacuum 
exists in our political system; the federal courts have the power and 
the duty to fill this vacuum.128 
 The article is also a model of how Lewis believed anyone should 
criticize the Court.  In the Minnesota Law Review, in 1961, he wrote, “So 
long as the Supreme Court has ultimate power in our system of government, 
it will need the toughest criticism.  So long as it has disinterested judges, they 
will welcome criticism as intellectual nourishment.  But the criticism, like the 
Court’s work, must be held to a standard.  It should be particular, not general; 
dispassionate, not biased; directed at the Justices’ performance, not their hon-
or . . . .”129 
From October Term, 1957 through October Term, 1963, ending in the 
summer of 1964, when he stopped being the Times’ Supreme Court reporter 
to prepare for becoming the Times’ London Bureau Chief in the spring of 
 
 125. Justice Robert Jackson took no part in the decision.  Id.; see also JOHN W. 
JOHNSON, HISTORIC U.S. COURT CASES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 260 (2d ed. 2001). 
 126. Chief Justice Harlan Stone resigned from the Court in April of 1946, so he 
also took no part in the decision.  JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 260. 
 127. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. 
 128. Lewis, supra note 114, at 1058-59. 
 129. Anthony Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REV. 305, 
332 (1961). 
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1965, Lewis held the Court to that standard as no journalist had done be-
fore.130  In The Journal of Supreme Court History, in 2004, the University of 
Texas’ L.A. Powe, Jr. wrote: “Lewis was the pioneer, the first reporter to see 
Supreme Court decisions, not just as a won-loss, but instead as part of a con-
tinuing constitutional process where reasons and reasoning mattered.”131  The 
sterling example is Lewis’ coverage of the Court’s rulings on reapportion-
ment.  For his Court reporting, he was awarded his second Pulitzer Prize for 
National Reporting, in 1963 – in particular, for his coverage of the landmark 
decision in Baker v. Carr.132 
Between 1946 in the Colegrove decision and 1960, when the Court de-
cided to hear Baker v. Carr, it summarily rejected ten challenges to unequal 
districts.133  Four justices who wanted to overrule Colegrove voted to take 
Baker, but it was not clear they had a fifth vote.  The case divided the Court 
on the central question of whether it had the power to decide the issue.  The 
justices took the unusual step of hearing argument twice in the case.  After 
the second argument, the justices were split four-four, with the ninth on the 
fence. 
But the facts of the case strongly supported what Lewis asserted in his 
law review article: “The evidence is overwhelming that neither Congress nor 
the state legislatures can be relied on to ensure equitable representation, in-
deed that there are virtually insurmountable, built-in obstacles to legislative 
action.”  In Tennessee, where the Baker case originated, the number of voters 
in legislative districts ranged from 2,340 to 42,298, as a result of the migra-
tion of Americans from farms to cities; some votes in a rural district counted 
eighteen times as much as those in an urban district because of grossly une-
ven apportionment.134 
Here is how Lewis reported the decision in March of 1962: 
The Supreme Court held today that the distribution of seats in State 
Legislatures was subject to the constitutional scrutiny of the Federal 
courts.  The historic decision was a sharp departure from the court’s 
traditional reluctance to get into questions of fairness in legislative 
districting.  It could significantly affect the nation-wide struggle of ur-
ban, rural and suburban forces for political power.  The vote, in a case 
brought by Tennessee city-dwellers, was 6-2.  Justice William J. 
Brennan Jr. wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren and Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, Tom C. 
Clark and Potter Stewart.  Clark and Stewart also wrote separate con-
 
 130. Lewis took up that position on April 1, 1965.  E-mail from Danielle Rhoades 
Ha, Director of Communications, N. Y. Times Co., to author (Jan. 7, 2015). 
 131. Powe, Jr., supra note 17, at 177. 
 132. 1963 Winners, PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1963 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 133. Anthony Lewis, The Most Skillful Liberal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/07/most-skillful-liberal/. 
 134. VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 301 (1971). 
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curring opinions.  The dissenters – each joining in an opinion by the 
other – were Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan.  
Justice Charles E. Whittaker, who has been in the hospital for ten days 
for a physical check-up, took no part in the decision.  The Supreme 
Court’s action was only a first step into the apportionment field.  It left 
many questions for decisions later.135 
The main unanswered question was what standard a state had to meet in 
creating voting districts.  A year later, in the case of Reynolds v. Sims, by a 
vote of 8-1, the Court ruled that “the constitutional prescription for election of 
members of the House of Representatives” meant that, “as nearly as is practi-
cable, one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another’s.”136  The Court enunciated the rule we now know as “one person, 
one vote.”137 
Earl Warren later said that the ruling in Baker was “the most vital deci-
sion” during his tenure as Chief Justice138 – more important than in Reynolds 
or even in Brown, which scholars often call the most significant Court deci-
sion of the twentieth century.139  Great stories often produce journalism priz-
es, but Lewis won his 1963 Pulitzer for what Harry W. Jones, an influential 
professor of jurisprudence at Columbia Law School, called “unquestionably 
the finest news coverage of constitutional and legal affairs that I have ever 
read, in this country or abroad.”140  Paul Freund quoted Jones’ praise when he 
took the rare step for an academic and wrote the Pulitzer advisory board to 
nominate Lewis “for his illuminating reporting of the United States Supreme 
Court during an epochal year . . . .”141 
The only hint of a cloud over any part of Lewis’ career is the question 
whether in his reporting about the Baker case, he engaged in advocacy that he 
should not have.  While he was covering the Supreme Court and the Justice 
Department during the Kennedy Administration, the administration was 
working out the position of the executive branch about legislative apportion-
 
 135. Anthony Lewis, Decision Is 6 to 2; Many States Likely to Be Affected by 
Landmark Case Supreme Court Gives U.S. Judges Voice in Reapportionment of State 
Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1962), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract
.html?res=9F0DE7DC153FE63ABC4F51DFB5668389679EDE. 
 136. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 
376 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 137. Id. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 138. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
67-68 (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 2d. ed. 1992). 
 139. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The 
Persistent Quest for Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 
638 (1997). 
 140. Letter from Paul A. Freund, supra note 35. 
 141. Id. 
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ment.142  The journalist Victor Navasky chronicled the course of action in his 
1971 book Kennedy Justice.143  
Archibald Cox, the new Solicitor General in the new Kennedy Admin-
istration, had serious reservations about asking the Court to tackle reappor-
tionment because of its recent precedent ruling that out on the grounds that it 
was a political question.144  Navasky wrote that Lewis “shed any pretense at 
objectivity”145 and “did not hesitate to let either the Solicitor or the Attorney 
General or their aides know how he felt about the matter.”146 
Navasky noted that Lewis “did his best not to overstep the boundaries of 
propriety”147 and that “[w]hatever kibbitzing” he did “was probably less im-
portant than the contribution he had already made in the pages of the Harvard 
Law Review[.]”148  But Navasky described Lewis as a “source of pressure.”149 
In Kennedy Justice, he included an unusually long quotation from an in-
terview with Lewis in which he gave the reporter the chance to explain his 
behavior.150  Lewis recalled his concern about propriety as a thirty-five-year-
old trailblazer on a new beat for the Times,151 yet in recollecting conversa-
tions with the Solicitor General and the Attorney General (he called them 
“Archie” and “Bobby”),152 he described what was indisputably point-of-view 
reporting on his part.153  Lewis told Navasky about his “happy – that puts it 
too shallowly – feeling”154 that the Attorney General “was completely con-
vinced of (a) the Constitutional rightness of one man, one vote, and (b) its 
urgent importance, politically and socially, for the country.”155  Lewis had 
advocated both in his Harvard Law Review article.  The majority opinion in 
Baker v. Carr cited it in Footnote 27.156  Lewis mentioned neither his article 
nor the footnote’s reference to it in his Times coverage of the case. 
“Change does not just begin at a point in time, it builds on history.” 
From the perspective of legal history, the end of Lewis’ tenure as the 
Times’ Court reporter coincided, more or less, with the end of scholarly con-
 
 142. NAVASKY, supra note 134, at 302-03. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 300. 
 145. Id. at 317. 
 146. Id. at 302. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 303. 
 149. Id. at 302. 
 150. Id. at 315-17. 
 151. See id. at 316. 
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 153. Id. 
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sensus about the role of the Supreme Court in American life.157  In 1959, 
Herbert Wechsler gave the prestigious Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law 
School.158  He weighed in on a freshly ignited debate about the perennial 
controversy surrounding judicial review and strongly defended the authority 
of the Court to enforce constitutional rights.159 
But he also questioned the Court’s extension of the principle underlying 
its ruling in Brown about “inherently unequal” separate schools for blacks, 
“to other public facilities, such as public transportation, parks, golf courses, 
bath houses, and beaches, which no one is obliged to use . . . .”160  Wechsler 
argued that while he vigorously favored the outcome in the Brown ruling, the 
Court had not justified it with a “neutral principle” that could be applied in 
other cases.161  As published in the Harvard Law Review in 1959 (Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law),162 Wechsler’s statement of doubt 
is one of the most cited articles ever in legal scholarship.163  It stirred a raft of 
passionate defenses, attacks, and other responses by scholars for many 
years.164 
A couple of years before, Robert Dahl, a Yale political scientist who 
was a giant in his field, had written: 
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal 
institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political 
system.  For it is also a political institution, an institution, that is to 
say, for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of national 
policy.  As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least 
because Americans are not quite willing to accept the fact that it is a 
political institution and not quite capable of denying it; so that fre-
quently we take both positions at once.  This is confusing to foreign-
ers, amusing to logicians, and rewarding to ordinary Americans who 
thus manage to retain the best of both worlds.165 
 
 157. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and 
Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 267-69, 287-88 (2008) (detailing the transition 
from the more judicially active Warren Court to the more conservative Rehnquist 
Court); Liptak, supra note 23 (detailing Lewis’ move to London in 1964). 
 158. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 n.d1 (1959). 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. Id. at 22. 
 161. Id. at 22-23. 
 162. Id. at 1. 
 163. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of 
All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
 164. See Anders Walker, “Neutral” Principles: Rethinking the Legal History of 
Civil Rights, 1934-1964, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 385, 436 n.6 (2009). 
 165. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 563-64 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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For legal scholars trying to sort out how the Supreme Court could be 
both a political and a legal institution, this was not a subject to joke about.  
Legal historian David Kennedy called Wechsler’s article “the highpoint of 
postwar constitutional legal theory,” and judged that the controversy about it 
marked “the end of the legal process as a consensus in American legal 
thought.”166  The Warren Court was transforming the federal courts from 
meek to mighty and stirring major disagreements among judges, scholars, and 
other Court followers. 
The consensus ended about the “ought” of the method – what it said 
about where in the system legal problems should be addressed and how cau-
tiously or confidently they should be solved.  But the “is” could be separated 
from the “ought.”  The legal process school, in particular Hart and Wechsler 
on federal courts, provided a grand, detailed, and authoritative map of the 
American constitutional system.167  In his reporting and writing, Lewis ex-
pertly followed that map, describing and championing the system while 
championing and challenging its big decisions. 
Lewis agreed with Hart and Wechsler’s main assumption about the fed-
eral system: as Richard H. Fallon, Jr. described it, “thoughtful, deliberative, 
unbiased decisions by government officials who are reasonably empowered 
to make such decisions” give the rule of law its legitimacy.168  To Lewis, Hart 
and Wechsler’s approach went beyond defining the essence of good lawyer-
ing.  Its careful, fair-minded, and sophisticated reasoning embodied the integ-
rity of the rule of law.  The approach provided a standard of intellectual and 
moral rigor for him to live up to in his reporting about the Supreme Court. 
Lewis explained the dramas about ideas at the heart of cases and the 
consequences of those ideas, through legal analysis, social observation, and 
portraits of the people involved, including the justices, advocates, and adver-
saries in cases.169  For him, the Court was both the commanding edifice on 
Washington’s Capitol Hill where fateful issues were decided and the pinnacle 
of the vast federal system – envisioned by America’s founders, elaborated 
over time, and elucidated by Hart and Wechsler.170  Lewis explained why 
rulings that seemed instantly to transform American law and life instead often 
resulted from decades of trial-and-error in the legal process.171  “Change does 
not just begin at a point in time,” Lewis emphasized, “it builds on history.”172 
Lewis’ knowing coverage helped build trust in momentous Court rulings 
– dramatically, in Gideon v. Wainwright,173 which, Paul Freund wrote, was 
 
 166. KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 62, at 321. 
 167. See generally FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 67. 
 168. Fallon, supra note 84, at 964. 
 169. See Liptak, supra note 23. 
 170. See ANTHONY LEWIS & N.Y. TIMES, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 305 (1964). 
 171. See id. at 15-16. 
 172. Id. at 5. 
 173. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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about the American legal process “redeeming itself.”174  In Gideon, in 1963, 
the Court overturned a roundly criticized 1942 precedent.175  It had held that 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to counsel, which clearly applies 
in federal criminal cases, did not extend to state cases.  As a result, countless 
poor defendants were convicted and jailed when they should not have 
been.176 
Twenty-one years later, the Court reversed that holding on grounds that 
the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials.”177  It found 
that anyone too poor to hire a lawyer must be provided one for free in any 
criminal case involving a felony charge.178  Lewis set out to write a children’s 
book179 about the case during a four-month newspaper strike.180  The project 
evolved into Gideon’s Trumpet, a trade book for adults published in 1964.181  
It became a bestseller and has never been out of print for the past half centu-
ry.182 
The first sentence goes, “In the morning mail of January 8, 1962, the 
Supreme Court of the United States received a large envelope from Clarence 
Earl Gideon, prisoner No. 003826, Florida State Prison, P.O. Box 221, Rai-
ford, Florida.”183  Behind this simple prose is the elaborate vision that Lewis 
gained most profoundly from Henry M. Hart, Jr.184 
Knowing of Hart’s influence on Lewis, it is hard not to see how closely 
parts of Gideon’s Trumpet express the analytical premises of that course: 
about the Supreme Court as a great tribunal, but with limited jurisdiction im-
posed by the Constitution, federal statutes, and Court precedents;185 about the 
divergent powers of federal and state courts, with state courts deciding vastly 
more cases yet with federal courts resolving disputes of national significance; 
 




 175. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
 176. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 
335. 
 177. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 178. Id. at 344. 
 179. Court and Constitution: A Talk with Anthony Lewis, HARVARD CRIMSON 
(Oct. 10, 1991), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1991/10/10/court-and-constitut-
ion-a-talk-with/. 
 180. Liptak, supra note 23. 
 181. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964). 
 182. Liptak, supra note 23. 
 183. LEWIS, supra note 181, at 3. 
 184. See Notes by Anthony Lewis, supra note 41. 
 185. Notes by Anthony Lewis, Student, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass. 
(Oct. 17, 1956) (on file with Margaret H. Marshall) (“Basic scheme of Const looks to 
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about “a curious and vital aspect of the American legal system”186 – “that 
many issues of federal law arise in the state courts”;187 about the requirement 
that the Supreme Court harmonize “jarring and discordant”188 interpretations 
in federal and state courts of the Constitution and federal laws; and about the 
American system’s premise that the Court will decide only real cases and 
controversies, yet when it does, it has the power to enlarge the Constitution’s 
safeguards.189  The Court expanded those safeguards in Gideon to ensure 
“fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal 
before the law.”190 
The Court did that again a year later, in New York Times v. Sullivan, a 
ruling of even greater consequence in reshaping American law and the Amer-
ican system.191  The Court addressed “for the first time the extent to which 
the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to 
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of 
his official conduct.”192  It decided that they are extensive, “to provide the 
safeguards”193 for those freedoms. 
The Court overturned a libel judgment against The New York Times by 
an Alabama trial court, which had found the paper liable for publishing, on a 
single day in March of 1960,194 minor errors in a Times advertisement bought 
by supporters of the civil rights movement.195  The trial court held the paper 
liable for failing to prove the truth of alleged accusations in the ad about L.B. 
Sullivan, a county commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama.196  Sullivan was 
never mentioned in the ad, but the ad said that the civil rights movement’s 
leader, Reverend Martin Luther King, had been arrested seven times in an 
effort to intimidate him (in fact, it was four) and the supposed connection 
between the ad and Sullivan was that he supervised the police.197 
The judgment for Sullivan was $500,000, the largest for libel in Ala-
bama history.198  With four other cases brought by Alabama officials pending, 
the Times anticipated it would be held liable for the ad for a total of $3 mil-
lion unless it got the judgment reversed on appeal.199  James Goodale, who 
later became the paper’s general counsel, said, “Without a reversal of those 
verdicts there was a reasonable question of whether the Times, then wracked 
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by strikes and small profits, could survive.”200  The application of Alabama 
libel law in the Sullivan case made it almost impossible to report and write 
truthfully about racial segregation and Southern racism, for the Times or any 
other news organization with even a tiny circulation in the state. 
The Supreme Court held that a public official cannot win libel damages 
for criticism of his performance as an official unless he proves that the critic 
knew or suspected that what he wrote was false.201  Regarding the factual 
errors in the ad, the Court wrote that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in 
free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”202  About the al-
leged libel of Sullivan, the Court said, “Injury to official reputation error af-
fords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than 
does factual error.”203 
The Court concluded in now-famous language that there is “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”204  This defense of “attacks on government and public officials” 
was a rejection of what Lewis in his account for the Times about the ruling 
called “the hated Sedition Act of 1798, which punished ‘false, scandalous, 
and malicious’ statements about Federal officials.”205 
The Court’s analysis in Sullivan rested on this rejection, which the 
Times had advocated in its brief in the case.206  As the lead lawyer for the 
paper argued before the Supreme Court, the Times was making “the same 
argument that James Madison made and that Thomas Jefferson made with 
respect to the validity of this Sedition Act of 1798”:207 the Act directly violat-
ed the First Amendment’s protection of the freedoms of expression and press, 
because under the Constitution, the people have the authority to say whatever 
they want about their representatives.208  Democracy entails such risk.209 
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Herbert Wechsler was that lawyer, who wrote the brief and made the 
oral argument.210  Almost three decades later, Lewis recounted Wechsler’s 
extraordinary role in the Times’ victory in Make No Law: The Sullivan Case 
and the First Amendment.211  “For the job of persuading the Supreme Court, 
the Times chose a scholar,” Lewis wrote, “a man of formidable intellect and 
formidable presence. There was a gravity about him, a sense of sureness 
about the law, an unwillingness to compromise with what he regarded as false 
doctrine.”212 
Critical to the choice, Lewis went on, “Wechsler was known as an ex-
pert on a subject relevant to the Sullivan libel case: federalism, the relation-
ship between state and federal law in our complex system.”213  Make No Law 
is the definitive account of how Wechsler – employing the careful reasoning 
of Hart & Wechsler (Lewis called it “the most profound and original Ameri-
can legal casebook”)214 – persuaded the Supreme Court to turn an Alabama 
libel case, where the First Amendment had been judged irrelevant, into the 
most important ruling ever on the First Amendment and the role of the press 
in the American constitutional system.215 
“Ours is a country not only of a constitution, but of constitutionalism.” 
Lewis’ books about Gideon and Sullivan are the best-known legacies of 
his career.  In tone and detail, they convey his belief that the Warren Court 
shaped majestic law in those landmark cases, so Lewis is often remembered 
as an enthusiast about that Court – a romantic about its greatness, a liberal 
whose outlook aligned with its liberalism. 
Instead, his view was more measured – more in sync with the modera-
tion at the heart of Hart & Wechsler.  In January of 1965, after he moved 
from Washington, D.C. to London for the Times, Lewis published a valedic-
tory piece about his perspective on the Court soon after he stopped covering 
it.  He wrote: 
A major concern of one who watches the Court these days is that it 
seems in too much of a hurry to solve all the world’s problems.  There 
are instances of the Court reaching out to decide issues that could have   
been avoided, or of laying out new constitutional doctrines more 
broadly than required to resolve a particular case.  The greatest of Jus-
tices, Louis Brandeis, warned against these practices as likely to lead 
the Court into false solutions that could have been avoided by narrow-
ing and postponing constitutional decisions and thus allowing time for 
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experience and reflection.  There is also the danger that reaching out 
to decide too much at once may give the public the impression of the 
exercise of naked power.  To be effective, Supreme Court decisions 
must in the long run win public acceptance, and they are more likely 
to do so if they are made to seem the careful product of legal reason-
ing than if they look like mere fiat.216 
There was also the perception that he covered the Court as a peer rather 
than as a reporter.  At a Harvard memorial service for Lewis in 2013, the 
Times’ former Executive Editor, Joseph Lelyveld, who presided at the paper 
for the last seven years Lewis was a columnist217 and was a decade young-
er,218 bolstered that view with this story: 
The first time we spoke I was a novice on night rewrite, taking his dic-
tation over the phone on deadline.  Tony was a star reporter, someone 
who lived his life in a more rarefied sphere than ordinary working 
stiffs.  My problem on rewrite was I couldn’t type as fast as Tony 
could dictate.  It was dinnertime and his impatience fairly crackled 
over the phone. “Hurry up, Joe,” he said, “I’ve got the Chief Justice 
waiting in the next room.”219 
Yet the more important lesson about Lewis’ stance in relation to the Su-
preme Court came from his Harvard Law Review article and was the oppo-
site: though he had great respect for Justice Felix Frankfurter and was grate-
ful for the Justice’s part in his getting the chance to study at Harvard Law and 
cover the Supreme Court, Lewis directly attacked a legal position the Justice 
held fiercely because Lewis was convinced Frankfurter was expressing a 
myopic view about the Court’s role in the American constitutional system.220 
When Lewis returned to the United States at the age of forty-six after his 
eight-year stint in London, he chose to live in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
rather than Washington, D.C.221  He did that partly because he wanted to re-
join the university community; for many years, Lewis taught about the press 
and the Constitution at Harvard Law School and about the First Amendment 
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at Columbia School of Journalism.222  But he also did that to avoid the chal-
lenge of writing critically about the public officials he ran into at cocktail and 
dinner parties.223 
In 1987, in The New York Times Magazine, to commemorate the 200th 
anniversary of the drafting of the Constitution, the sixty-year-old Lewis 
called attention to the name he had given the vision of law to which Harvard 
Law School had opened his eyes: 
The United States has been shaped by arguments over the Constitu-
tion, as it has been by the Constitution itself.  The search for meaning 
in a written document is lawyers’ work, and by looking to the Consti-
tution for answers to fundamental political questions we have given 
lawyers and judges an extraordinary role in our democracy.  That has 
spilled over into a general reliance on law to solve problems.  Ours is 
a country not only of a constitution, but of constitutionalism.224 
Constitutionalism calls for the Supreme Court to protect the freedom of 
Americans from the “prodigious increase”225 in executive and legislative 
powers in the federal government, from lawlessness in state and local gov-
ernance that threatens to damage America’s “divided governmental pow-
ers,”226 and from incursions that result from the politics of fear when the na-
tion’s security is tested.227  Constitutionalism calls for government to heed 
history and change the law to right moral wrongs, as happened with racial 
justice and equal rights for women, and for judges to initiate “great advances 
in the quality – the decency – of American society” when politics is against 
them.228 
To Lewis, journalists play an essential role in constitutionalism – theirs 
is a form of public service.  That is because of the First Amendment and “the 
vast body of law that judges have built up over the years . . .” safeguarding 
freedom of speech and press.229  That is because what he called “the Madi-
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sonian premise”230 – in James Madison’s words, “the right of freely examin-
ing public characters and measures”231 – is “the premise of the American 
political system.”232 
Yet Lewis’ belief in constitutionalism brooked no exceptions in adher-
ing to it.  Even the press, with its quasi-constitutional function, “should not 
give even the appearance of claiming superiority to the law,” he told the Mas-
sachusetts Historical Society: that “would breed arrogance, a state of mind as 
unbecoming in journalists as in politicians.”233  The essential modesty of that 
position contrasts strikingly with today’s idealized adversarial stance. 
In practical terms, Lewis wrote that journalists should not get blanket 
immunity from subpoenas in criminal cases, even though he believed they 
must rely on confidential sources in vital stories that hold the government 
accountable.234  To resolve a stand-off between the government and a journal-
ist who has published a leak, he favored weighing the harm done by the leak 
against the public interest in its disclosure: when a leak reflects an effort to 
harm a critic of a policy,235 for example, rather than to hold the government 
accountable, his view was that the journalist must identify the leaker doing 
the hatchet job. 
Lewis also believed that while the “guarantees of freedom of speech and 
of the press are fundamentals of freedom,” they are “not the only essentials of 
a healthy society” and that if they “succeed in totally overriding the interest 
of privacy, it would be a terrible victory.”236  Courts were the places to re-
solve such basic conflicts, to strike the right balance between competing in-
terests, or to experiment with different balances until the balance is right. 
Beginning in 2000, when the Supreme Court resolved the presidential 
election in Bush v. Gore237 and made George W. Bush president, Lewis could 
be mistaken for a liberal who had lost patience with a Supreme Court turned 
partisan and decidedly conservative.  From then until Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Elections Commission238 a decade later, when the Supreme Court ruled 
that the government cannot ban political spending by corporations in elec-
 
 230. Anthony Lewis, The Critical Role of the Press: Issues of Democracy, 
NIEMAN REPORTS, Spring 1984, at 10. 
 231. Id. 
 232. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 61. 
 233. Anthony Lewis, Rights and Responsibilities of the Newsman, in RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES: INTERNATIONAL, SOCIAL, AND INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS 231, 244 
(Joyce J. Bartell ed. 1980). 
 234. See id. at 239-45. 
 235. See id. at 239. 
 236. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 80. 
 237. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (per curiam). 
 238. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss4/4
2014] WHAT HE LEARNED AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 899 
tions, Lewis regularly thundered against decisions brought about by the 
Court’s conservative majority.239 
He wrote in 2011, “Today’s conservatives act again and again on behalf 
of a narrow, powerful interest: the rich.  The apotheosis was the Citizens 
United case, overruling a hundred years of constitutional law to give corpora-
tions unlimited power to contribute to election campaigns.”240 
But Lewis’ criticism of the conservative Court was pure Hart & 
Wechsler – it relied on what he described as “faith not in men but in law: the 
law of the Constitution.”241  Whether he was criticizing the Court or extolling 
its use of power for the public good, he remained an advocate for the Ameri-
can system and a believer in its legal foundation.  The best way to bridge the 
sometimes irreconcilable ideological divide between the five conservative 
justices appointed by Republican presidents and the four moderate liberal 
justices appointed by Democrats was not to replace result-oriented conserva-
tives with result-oriented liberals. 
Lewis was beside himself with frustration about the Supreme Court tak-
ing Bush v. Gore – a politically charged case that, by principles of the federal 
system as he had learned them from the masters, the Florida Supreme Court 
should have been allowed to resolve.242  The Supreme Court ruled that the 
state court’s method for recounting ballots violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause and that no alternative method could be es-
tablished within the time limits set by Florida.243 
In the Times, Lewis wrote, “So the country is left with the impression 
that five justices acted as they did because they cared more about the result – 
ending the recount – than they did about the reasoning that would compel 
it.”244  He went on, “Deciding a case of this magnitude with such disregard 
for reason invites people to treat the court’s aura of reason as an illusion.  
That would be a terrible price to pay.  The Supreme Court must have the last 
word in our system because its role is essential to our structure of freedom.  
Preservation of the public respect on which the institution depends is far more 
important than who becomes president.”245 
In his final column, he cautioned, “In the end I believe that faith in rea-
son will prevail.  But it will not happen automatically.  Freedom under law is 
hard work.”246 
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